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This article considers the geographic effects of conditional cash transfer programs 
(CCTs), focusing specifically on the ways they rework space, modes of production, 
and State/society relationships. While CCTs appear linked to neoliberal development 
and biopolitical governance regimes (viz., governmentality), this article highlights the 
counterintuitive reasons for why CCTs sometimes fail to meet these broader State 
objectives. More directly, despite obvious tactics of Statecraft behind CCT initiatives, 
the effects of these programs can in fact undermine their intended governance 
outcomes. Drawing from case study research in rural northeastern Brazil – where an 
overwhelming majority of residents receive Bolsa Família CCT benefits – this article 
examines the political geographic changes induced by Bolsa Família in a region that 
has until recently seen very little State presence. By engaging a geographic 
perspective that focuses on the political and economic effects of CCT programs, this 
article sheds new light on processes of governance and development in a host of 
countries throughout the Global South.   
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When it comes to ongoing territorial disputes, one of the world’s largest lies 
tucked away in the sertão (backlands or hinterlands; often synonymous with desert or 
outback) of northeastern Brazil (Thomaz, 2011). Located along the Ibiapaba mountain 
range several kilometers inland from the coast (see Fig. 1), this disputed area – 
referred to in this article as Ponta Finai – runs north-south along the shared border 
between the statesii of Ceará and Piauí. According to a 2008 report conducted by the 
Cearense Institute of Research and Economic Strategy (IPECE), Ponta Fina 
encompasses 2,821 square kilometers and has a population of roughly 10,000 people 
(Sena, 2013). Were Ponta Fina its own state, it would be nearly the size of the US 
state of Rhode Island. The dispute dates back well into the nineteenth century, when 
the imperial government of Dom Pedro II redrew the boundary between the two states 
but never generated precise cartographic coordinates. Since then there has never been 
a clear border between Ceará and Piauí, and while both states lay claim to much of the 
Ponta Fina region, neither one has provisioned very well for the local population. 
Both states appear to want territorial rights, but neither has seemed very interested in 
developing the region or providing services for the people.    
(Figure 1 about here.) 
In 2013 I made my first of two extended field visits to this region. The original 
purpose of this research was to consider ‘Stateless’ territories and the populations that 
inhabit them (see for example Hagmann & Korf, 2012; Jones, 2009; Steinberg & 
Chapman, 2009). What I found, however, was that very few Ponta Fina residents 
worried about the political or cartographic particularities of the territorial dispute: for 
example, whether they might be (re)classified as cearense or piauiense. Instead, what 
concerned most people was Brazil’s Programa Bolsa Família (PBF) conditional cash 
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transfer initiative and the security of this program in the Ponta Fina region. PBF is the 
primary income source for most families in the area, yet administration of the 
program is hindered by Ponta Fina’s geographic ambiguity. To address PBF and 
broader issues of food security, one must also address the territorial dispute, bringing 
to light a mess of geographical entanglements. More directly, conditional cash 
transfer programs (CCTs) in federative republics like Brazil are administered through 
state and municipal networks, and when these networks are complicated by 
ambiguities such as border disputes CCTs face administrative roadblocks. ‘State’ (i.e., 
federal) resources cannot be delivered to ‘stateless’ people. Even more to the point, 
CCTs produce a host of geographical effects, and in a poor region like Ponta Fina 
where: a) nearly everyone receives PBF, and; b) the administration of PBF is 
particularly difficult, the myriad geographies of CCTs are laid especially bare. More 
than simply putting food on the table in millions of households worldwide, CCTs also 
have tremendous impacts on space, governance, cartographies, and political economic 
relationships.   
The purpose of this article is to investigate the geographies of CCTs, and more 
specifically to consider how these programs rework relationships between people, 
space, economic activity, and the State. While there exists a growing literature on 
CCTs in the social sciences, relatively few geographers have weighed in on these 
debates. I attempt here to highlight the value of geographic perspectives in analyses of 
CCTs, arguing that spatially attuned analytical frameworks provide new insight to the 
ways CCTs change (and are changed by) processes like governance, neoliberalism, 
and even cartography. Beginning with an overview of critical research on CCTs, 
emergent debates connecting CCTs to governance and neoliberalism, and 
contributions from geographers, I then move on to consider my case study from Ponta 
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Fina and the geographic effects of Bolsa Família. My findings contribute to existing 
research linking CCTs with governmentality and neoliberalism (e.g., Corboz, 2013; 
Ferguson, 2010; Hossain, 2010; Peck, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Saad-Filho, 
2015; Sener, 2015), yet what I also argue is that CCTs induce a host of differentiated 
effects that undermine State efforts to govern space, implement formalized 
economies, and create neoliberal citizen-subjects. By interrogating the relationships 
between CCTs, space, and governance, my hope is that this article opens new 
pathways for critical geographic research into State-led development initiatives (e.g., 
Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie, 2005; Bebbington & McCourt, 2007; Peck and 
Theodore, 2015; Roy, 2010, 2012).  
CRITICAL RESEARCH OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
 In 1995, faced with economic decline and rising levels of hunger, the Mexican 
government piloted a new anti-poverty initiative aimed at addressing 
underdevelopment on multiple levels. Called Progresa – and later renamed 
Oportunidades – this program sought to address hunger through cash transfers to low-
income families. The money, however, came with conditional requirements that 
recipient families make regular visits to health clinics (for checkups and education) 
and children maintain good attendance at school. Known today as a ‘Conditional Cash 
Transfer’ (CCT), such programs have since grown immensely popular and have been 
implemented in dozens of lesser-developed countries worldwide (Ballard, 2013).  The 
world’s largest and perhaps best-known CCT program is Brazil’s Programa Bolsa 
Família (PBF), a merger of smaller and pre-existing CCTs rolled out under the PT 
(Worker’s Party) in 2003 (Saad-Filho, 2015). Today PBF reaches nearly 14 million 
households, meaning that more than one-quarter of Brazil’s population – roughly 50 
million people – receive the benefit (Campello and Neri, 2013). Families become 
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eligible if their household income falls below R$150 per capita per month (USD 55-
60), and the amount of money they receive depends on the number of dependents 
living in the house relative to total household income (Santos, 2013). The program is 
widely considered one of the PT’s most successful (if not also controversial) anti-
poverty initiatives, and PBF is credited with helping to significantly reduce income 
inequality in Brazil over the last decade (Pereira, 2015).   
 Published research considering the effects of PBF and other CCTs has grown 
steadily in recent years (Fenwick, 2009; Gupta, 2012; Hall, 2008; Seekings, 2012). 
The topics of this work range broadly, but general themes include poverty reduction 
(Fiszbein and Shady, 2009; Handa and Davis, 2006; Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2010), 
gender equality (Corboz, 2013; Molyneux, 2007; Molyneux and Thomson, 2011), 
education and child welfare (Hanlon, Barrientos, & Hulme, 2010; Hossain, 2010; 
Leroy, Ruel, & Verhofstadt, 2009), and the political economic repercussions of CCT 
‘conditionalities’ (Ballard, 2013; Hall, 2013; Taylor, 2009). In line with studies that 
examine the biopolitical implications of social spending programs in developing 
countries (Hickey, 2010; Li, 2007, 2009; Miller and Rose, 2008), researchers have 
also focused on the ways CCTs intertwine with neoliberal development strategies to 
create more ‘productive,’ market-savvy citizen-subjects (Ferguson, 2010; Peck, 2011; 
Peck and Theodore, 2010). Notes Tania Li, though the benefits of large-scale 
development projects should not be overlooked in the Global South (viz., reducing 
hunger, especially in rural areas), they are overwrought with neoliberal governance. 
She critically unpacks technocratic initiatives aimed at promoting development and 
environmental conservation in Southeast Asia, connecting them to Foucauldian 
notions of governmentality: highly technocratic methods of governance where 
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specific interventions are made to improve the productive capacities of the population, 
finely tuning their practices “to achieve optimal [productive] results” (Li, 2007: p. 6).  
Drawing from Li’s work, Naomi Hossain (2010) argues that like many State 
development initiatives, CCTs are designed to increase governmentality among poor 
populations. The poor are formally educated in ways that orient their practices and 
desires towards development goals, in addition to submitting to the State’s medical 
gaze and biopolitical strategies (e.g., registration and biometric capture, notification of 
household and residential change, reporting of income and school attendance, 
monthly visits to agencies to receive payment). Like other scholars drawing on 
Foucault (Luccisano, 2006; Meltzer, 2013; Sener, 2015), Hossain scrutinizes CCT 
programs not so much for their effectiveness at addressing poverty and reducing 
hunger, but rather for their governance and personal conduct objectives. In line with 
large-scale development projects (Li, 2007, 2009) and government welfare initiatives 
(Miller and Rose, 2008), CCTs appear designed to make more governable, compliant, 
and highly productive populations out of the poor.   
Related to these governmentality debates, several scholars also argue that CCT 
conditionalities evidence broader neoliberal agendas, where the intent is to mold 
program recipients into responsible and rational consumers who are free-willed yet 
reliably governable (Corboz, 2013; Peck, 2011; Peck and Theodore 2010, 2012, 2015; 
Saad-Filho, 2010; Standing, 2011). Though neoliberalism remains, as James Ferguson 
points out (2010), a slippery frame of analysis, CCTs generally evidence an 
underlying neoliberal logic: they are intended to induce fiscal responsibility within 
poorer populations whereby people come to engage with formal economic markets 
through rational, individual choices (see also Hickey, 2010 and Meltzer, 2013). More 
directly, and pulling once again from Ferguson (2010), neoliberalism in this context 
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can be defined broadly as the way private sphere market mechanisms and technocratic 
management strategies become applied to State operations, and citizens become 
increasingly responsible for their own individual welfare, supposedly capable of 
assessing risk and making sound economic decisions. As such, Ferguson argues, 
CCTs can be both neoliberal and pro-poor: despite their neoliberal underpinnings – 
which as he rightly points out do not necessarily make them “evil” – they make 
significant contributions to recipient families and represent an important shift in the 
way poverty is addressed by the State.  
Looking to existing policy documents, there is clear indication that PBF 
attempts to achieve both pro-poor and neoliberal development objectives. According 
to Tereza Campello, head of Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development and Fight 
Against Hunger (MDS), PBF was launched “as part of an integrated strategy of social 
inclusion and economic development” (Campello and Neri, 2013: p. 15). Along with 
combating extreme poverty and hunger, the program’s goals also include 
“strengthening programs of family agriculture, defense and protection of formal 
employment and the extension of social security” (ibid: p. 15). Drawing on evidence 
published by Brazil’s Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a 
government-led research and public policy institution, Campello also highlights 
PBF’s achieved objectives for strengthening Brazil’s labor market and “reducing 
operational costs and strengthening the autonomy of the beneficiary” (ibid: p. 17).  
 Reflecting on such policy objectives, economist Alfredo Saad-Filho (2015) 
agrees with Ferguson that CCTs are neoliberal in their design, yet disagrees that PBF 
is a “pro-poor” program. It provides only humble support for those who are ostensibly 
destitute, he argues, and makes little attempt to address significant inequality. 
Recipients are guided towards formal economic markets, credit and loan programs, 
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and increased capitalist consumption, yet nothing is done to alter the very structures 
that reproduce poverty and socio-economic disparities (e.g., low wages, poor public 
education, underwhelming employment opportunities). Going further, Richard Ballard 
(drawing from Morton, 2013) observes that such initiatives recall Gramscian notions 
of “passive revolution,” in which modest concessions are made at the top to appease 
those on the bottom, “so that existing elites can manage the inclusion of marginalized 
groups rather than lose control as they would in a conventional revolution” (2013: p. 
816). Thus the political effects of cash transfers like PBF, suggests Anthony Hall 
(2008; 2013), not only enable cuts to social spending in some cases; they can also 
entrench political patronage relationships whereby broader clientelistic networks form 
at the national scale. As each of these works highlight, CCT programs are intended 
not merely to fight hunger, but also to alter the behaviors and practices of the poor, 
“nudging” them (Standing, 2011) to become more compliant, governable subjects. 
The general consensus is that CCTs are enormously complex in their origins, 
objectives, and effects, and to better understand how they work on the ground – to see 
how they might be neoliberal and pro-poor (Ferguson, 2010) – further research must 
be carried out.  
 Within this broad and interdisciplinary literature on CCTs, geographers are 
curiously underrepresented. Though geographers have made important contributions 
to work on critical development (e.g., Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie, 2005; Hart, 
2004; Wainwright, 2008) and political economic initiatives in the Global South (e.g., 
Peet, 2007; Peet and Watts, 2004; Roy, 2010, 2012), few have entered specifically 
into debates over CCTs and their effects. More to the point, geographers have helped 
to provide analytical insight on the political and socio-spatial implications of CCTs 
(Ballard, 2013; Peck, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2010, 2012, 2015), but much rarer 
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are geographical field studies focused directly on CCTs themselves. As Ferguson 
points out (2010, 2011), there remain numerous questions regarding flows of power 
and the diverse effects of initiatives like PBF. Echoing Li (2007; 2009), he 
acknowledges the very real benefits of CCTs, and he speculates whether these 
programs might in fact produce new lines of flight that subvert governance 
technologies and mobilize more active and empowered forms of citizenship. These 
are not questions, he writes, “to be answered theoretically or ideologically; the only 
answer that really convinces is the empirical and experimental one: Let us find out!” 
(2011: p. 67). Beginning in the next section I take up Ferguson’s challenge, arguing 
that, indeed, the geographic effects of PBF are broadly diverse, often mismatching 
with State objectives and governmentalized technologies designed to produce 
uniform, docile citizen-subjects. My analysis focuses on the effects of differing 
administrative scales (e.g., municipal, state, federal) and how CCT programs, 
particularly in rural areas, reshape a host of underlying geographies (migration, urban 
development, economic growth, spatial connectivities, etc.). As my findings show, 
neither people nor the Brazilian State engage PBF in especially predictable ways, and 
the ramifications this holds for governance, space, and neoliberal capitalism shed light 
on broader futures of political economic development in the Global South.  
 Data for this article were collected from 2013-2014 during two rounds of 
fieldwork in Ceará and Piauí. Both trips to the field lasted for two months, and on the 
second trip I returned to many of the same areas I visited the first time. My research 
design involved three primary modes of investigation: 1) interviews, document 
analysis, and participant observation with state actors and institutions involved with 
the Ponta Fina dispute; 2) interviews and participant observation with residents living 
in Ponta Fina, and; 3) interviews with local experts living near to the region, along 
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with archival and historical document analysis. With respect to the first of these data 
collection strategies, I conducted participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews with State actors (n = 18, including several follow up interviews) working 
at institutions such as the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the 
Cearense Institute of Research and Economic Strategy (IPECE), and politicians and 
municipal workers connected to the Ponta Fina region. These interviews queried 
ongoing reasons for the territorial dispute, opinions on why it remained unresolved, 
and the most difficult challenges faced by Ponta Fina residents. I also reviewed 
documents, maps, and technical reports produced by these institutions to gather basic 
data as well as to gain insight regarding the State’s vision of the Ponta Fina region 
(see for example Scott, 1998).   
My second mode of data collection involved semi-structured interviews with 
Ponta Fina residents (n = 22, including 11 follow up interviews) and sustained periods 
of participatory observation fieldwork in the region. My questions to residents 
focused on the daily challenges they confronted, municipal infrastructure needs and 
future concerns, their engagements with citizenship (e.g., public education, public 
healthcare, State agencies, voting and politics), and interactions with the State more 
generally. Initial participants were identified through contacts outside of Ponta Fina, 
and subsequent participants were enlisted through snowballing techniques. I also 
traveled extensively throughout Ponta Fina to visit resident communities, and this was 
important for understanding the landscape and spatial (dis)connectivities of the 
region. And finally, my third mode of investigation involved interviews with regional 
experts (n = 5) in Sobral, Ceará, and Parnaíba, Piauí, in order to understand historical 
underpinnings of the dispute and the geographic and political economic reasons for its 
continuance. These interview data were useful for rounding out ‘expert’ opinions on 
	 11	
the subject matter, as well as for shedding light on broader political and socio-
economic processes at work in the Ponta Fina region.  
BOLSA FAMÍLIA AND GOVERNMENTALITY IN THE PONTA FINA REGION  
On the final ten days of every month, in small cities and towns across the 
Brazilian Northeast, long lines of people wait outside local branch offices of Brazil’s 
Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal). Each of them holds their family’s 
PBF account card – which looks and functions much like a debit card – and they wait 
to have their monthly PBF allowance credited to their account. For reasons relating to 
the conditionalities of CCT programs, in addition to Brazil’s own penchant for 
bureaucratic (over)administration (e.g., Faoro, 1975), PBF monthly allowances are 
not transferred automatically each month to recipient families: someone, physically, 
must present the card on a certain day each month at their local branch of the Federal 
Savings Bank in order to have the money credited to the family’s account. So many 
people receive the benefit, and the process of attending to each individual family is 
inevitably slowed by questions and complications, that the procedure must be drawn 
out over several days. And so for ten days at the end of each month, in front of 
Federal Savings Bank branch offices all over the Northeast (as well as elsewhere in 
Brazil), millions of people wait in line to receive their monthly PBF benefit (see Fig. 
2).   
(Figure 2 about here.)            
 Such protocols draw attention to how governmentality undergirds 
development initiatives such as CCT programs (cf., Hickey, 2010; Hossain, 2010; Li, 
2007; 2009; Meltzer, 2013; Sener, 2015). Bodies are pinned down to certain locations 
at given times, people present themselves to the gaze and oversight of the State 
apparatus, desired behaviors and practices are induced through incentivized schemes, 
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and a more compliant, docile, and productive society is engineered through non-
coercive means. As Foucault would have it (2007), a pastoral relationship of good 
governance between the population and the State is made possible, whereby the 
former is meant to respect and even seek out the oversight and guidance of the latter. 
Poor people become “patients” of the State (Auyero, 2011), and the waiting they must 
endure time and again reinforces their unequal position in hierarchies of pastoral 
governance. CCTs are beneficial to recipients, to be sure, but so too are they useful 
for the State: new and more reliable regimes of governance often accompany social 
spending initiatives.  
 The governmentalized effects of development programs such as CCTs are 
particularly evident in rural areas where people have historically had little contact 
with the State (cf., Li, 2007; Parsons, 2015). In countries like Brazil, levels of 
poverty, malnourishment, infant mortality, truancy, and so on tend to be much higher 
in the agricultural hinterlands than in urban areas. As such, CCTs are nearly 
unprecedented in their capacities to build greater levels of engagement between rural 
populations and the State. In regions where generations of people have rarely 
frequented schools, hospitals, and health clinics, children today are attending classes 
regularly, routinely seeing medical professionals, and receiving guidance on basic 
standards of hygiene and nutrition. Few places in Brazil show this trend more 
obviously than Ponta Fina, where until the advent of PBF in 2003 few residents had 
much contact whatsoever with the State.  
 In the last few years, however, the conditionalities required by PBF have 
brought a host of changes to the Ponta Fina region.iii Whereas in the past residents 
sought medical attention only in the most serious circumstances, today, per PBF 
requirements, they bring their children for regular checkups, women receive pre and 
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post-natal care and counseling, and prescription medicines, in limited quantities and 
varieties, are available in some places. A majority of adults in Ponta Fina are 
functionally illiterate, but most children under the age of 18 now attend school 
regularly. And while household and demographic information was severely limited 
just ten years ago, today the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
has vastly improved census data for the region. Explained one IBGE technical expert, 
“Our better knowledge of this area allows us to make better interventions, to help the 
population and to build capacity.” To be sure, the State has a much stronger presence 
now than it did in years past, and just as researchers have observed with social welfare 
and development programs elsewhere (Ferguson, 2011; Gupta, 2012; Hossain, 2010; 
Li, 2007), the governmentality effects of this are easily observed in the daily practices 
of Ponta Fina residents.  
 Yet not all of these effects fall so easily under governmentality, nor is the 
expansion of governmentality in the region necessarily linked with more effective 
State governance (i.e., pastoral power). As one might expect, due in part to the 
requirements of PBF, residents of Ponta Fina – more than 98 percent of whom receive 
the benefit – have grown more concerned over the availability of resources such as 
public schools and health clinics. But accessing these resources, and establishing the 
links necessary for greater levels of pastoral governance and governmentality, are 
complicated by multiple factors. The first relates to the border dispute, and the 
difficulties residents face when they try to access State resources. Lamented Camila, a 
53-year-old lifetime resident of Ponta Fina: 
Two years ago we were told that now we live in Piauí, and that we 
needed to register with the municipality there [in Piauí]. So I went, and 
it’s much further away, and I was told that they couldn’t register us 
because according to their records we lived in Ceará. So I went back to 
the municipality [in Ceará], I explained what happened, and I said, ‘I 
have no options, what should I do?’ They told me that for a short time 
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we could continue as before, but that soon we would have to formally 
register with the municipality in Piauí because it was the law and they 
couldn’t keep attending to us. And that’s how things continue until 
today, thank God, but I don’t know when they’ll change.  
 
Others in Ponta Fina recounted similar experiences, describing how they had been 
bounced back and forth between municipal and state offices in Ceará and Piauí, 
hearing from both sides that, officially, they lived in the other state. Even PBF 
monthly payments are at risk in the geographically ambiguous region, since the 
federal program is administered through municipal institutions, and thus one must 
secure municipal domicile in order to collect the benefit. But these examples are 
somewhat specific to Ponta Fina and other similarly disputed regions (of which there 
are several in Brazil and other federative republics), and do not necessarily 
characterize PBF or CCTs elsewhere.  
In order to better illustrate how State efforts to build governance through CCT 
programs are regularly undermined, it is therefore useful to consider the roles of 
individual State actors. While the job of political and infrastructural administration in 
a poor municipality comes with drawbacks relating to low tax revenues and limited 
economic growth, there exist, in fact, federal and state spending initiatives to aid 
municipalities where a majority of residents receive PBF. Recognizing that such 
municipalities logically tend to be poorer, additional federal and state money can be 
made available to municipal authorities to undertake and maintain infrastructural 
facilities (e.g., everything from buildings and institutions to roadways, water, and 
electricity). The higher the percentage of low-income families in a given municipality, 
the more federal and state assistance authorities in that municipality can request. As 
such, in poor regions, it can be advantageous for municipal authorities to register and 
report as many low-income residents as possible, recognizing it as a potential means 
for filling municipal coffers.  
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The problem, however, is that when this money is allocated, not all of it is 
spent on the projects for which it is intended. Like many countries in which CCTs are 
at work, political corruption creates serious problems in Brazil (Avritzer, 2008; Power 
& Taylor, 2011), and it is perhaps not surprising that municipal authorities find ways 
to siphon away federal and state money intended to improve State resources for poor 
residents. Shoddy and corrupt political administration materializes in a host of 
infrastructural contexts, ranging from basic neglect and under-facilitated State 
institutions, to highly priced and poorly delivered public works projects. As just one 
example, this explains why some municipal authorities actively claim residence of 
poor families within their municipalities, yet deny services to those same families 
upon request (i.e., telling them they live in a different state/municipality). Another 
example, and one cited by numerous Ponta Fina residents during interviews, concerns 
large portions of a federal highway that runs through the region (BR–404). On the 
Piauí side, the road is paved, as all federal highways are supposed to be. On the Ceará 
side, however, the road remains unpaved, stretching eastward from Piauí for several 
kilometers until it nears the small city of Poranga. As one woman who lives alongside 
the unpaved roadway complained, “According to law, and on paper, this road is 
paved, because it’s a federal highway. According to maps, this road is paved. By 
definition this road has to be paved because it’s a federal highway. But look at it! It’s 
a disgrace!” The roadway thus stands as a dubious monument to State failure: despite 
the transportation difficulties imposed on thousands of people living in Ponta Fina – 
many of whom struggle to get their children to and from school each day and remain 
ostensibly cut off from emergency response personnel – the roadway remains 
unpaved, serving as a daily reminder of State dysfunction and ineptitude (see Fig. 3). 
(Figure 3 about here.)            
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 What these sorts of examples help to illustrate are how State efforts to build 
pastoral relations of governance (i.e., governmentality) through development 
programs like PBF become undermined, perversely, by those very same programs. 
More precisely, though CCTs appear in many ways to be instruments of 
governmentality, they are administered by State actors who may or may not be 
concerned with broader governance objectives. Not surprisingly this is picked up on 
by the general population, who, despite going through the (governmentality) motions 
built into programs like PBF, fail to see the State as a source of good, pastoral 
governance. PBF recipients carry out program requirements, but to say that their 
engagements with the State are especially pastoral would be shortsighted: they hold 
little faith in the State’s capabilities. They associate State actors and institutions not 
with ‘good shepherding,’ but with incompetence, negligence, and corruption. To draw 
on another of Foucault’s metaphors (1995), it is as if the structures of Bentham’s 
panopticon are in place, yet everyone knows there is no one who might be watching. 
What PBF has therefore led to in Ponta Fina is a growing sense of urgency relating to 
the border dispute, though not necessarily due to discourses of citizenship or 
governmentality. Residents scramble to secure their monthly payments and fulfill 
program requirements because they want the money, and State actors scramble to 
secure federal and state aid because they also want the money. State actors are 
preoccupied not so much with governance, nor local residents with state identity or 
citizenship rights, but rather both are concerned with how the border dispute could 
negatively affect their individual interests. Tensions within and relating to Ponta Fina 
have therefore escalated in recent years, but the reasons for this have little to do with 
issues of State presence (or abandonment) or even the border dispute itself, and 
instead connect much more directly to the effects of PBF.    
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 As several researchers have rightly argued (cf., Hossain, 2010; Li, 2007; 
Meltzer, 2013; Miller and Rose, 2008; Sener, 2015), motivations behind social 
welfare programs like CCTs are closely linked with State power and pastoral, self-
reproducing regimes of governance (e.g., governmentality). They represent strategies 
by which governments can induce greater intensities of administration and State 
presence within spaces and populations perceived to be in need of better oversight. 
But as evidence from one such region in Brazil indicates, the introduction of PBF has 
produced a rather contradictory set of effects: it has brought material benefits to 
residents of Ponta Fina, yet it has also intensified problems of State absence and 
neglect, working in some instances to undermine the broader governance objectives of 
the program. Some lessons here likely stem from the unique geography of Ponta Fina 
(e.g., the ongoing border dispute), and thus may not necessarily characterize CCTs or 
other contexts more generally. But what this case study certainly highlights are the 
ways that State efforts to establish new and stronger regimes of governance through 
CCT programs are sometimes undermined by State actors themselves. More to the 
point, a program like PBF may be engineered to produce greater levels of 
governmentality, but administration of the program itself can limit and in some cases 
even reverse these effects. The next section of this article expands upon this idea by 
exploring some of the geographic changes provoked by PBF, and in the penultimate 
section I connect these themes to broader debates over CCTs and neoliberalism. 
Ultimately it is my goal not to argue that PBF and other CCTs are entirely 
disconnected from processes of neoliberalism or governmentality, but rather to show 
how these processes remain incomplete and even stunted by the day-to-day practices 
of CCT program recipients and administrators.      
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND GEOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
	 18	
 Just as the effects of CCTs have been most striking among rural populations – 
especially with respect to reducing malnutrition, child labor, and truancy – so too 
have they brought significant change to many small towns and rural areas. Nowhere is 
this more obvious in northeastern Brazil than in locations where branch offices of the 
Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal) are located. As PBF recipients 
report to bank officers each month to receive payment, they regularly spend their 
money in the very same towns where branch offices are located. Economic analyses 
have shown PBF to have strong multiplier effects (Campello and Neri, 2013), and in 
rural areas these effects are especially pronounced (see also Pereira, 2015). Towns 
with a branch office of the Federal Savings Bank, while not necessarily home to 
thriving economies, tend very often to have lively market districts (cf., Handa and 
Davis, 2006). Several times each month residents from surrounding agricultural 
communities come to town, collect their PBF benefit, and buy in bulk the things they 
need before returning home. By comparison, towns without a branch of the Federal 
Savings Bank rarely have much formal economic activity and tend to remain small, 
agricultural villages. PBF is by no means the sole cause of such discrepancies, but 
since the program was introduced in 2003 these regional imbalances have grown 
larger. 
 Another important geographic change induced by CCTs relates to formal 
economies, particularly when considering the exchange of foodstuffs in rural areas. 
Remembering that PBF money is transferred onto the card of a given account holder – 
rather than deposited as cash into an account holder’s personal bank account – 
recipients are limited in where they can spend their money and what they can buy. 
PBF cards work much like debit cards, and thus the money cannot be spent outside 
the formal economy or even at street markets and small stores (of which there are 
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many in rural Brazil). Vendors must have the necessary electronic card readers to 
accept PBF money, and in this way there is much regulation over where cardholders 
shop and what they purchase. This has introduced significant change in the lives of 
agricultural people, many of whom, until the advent of PBF, procured much of their 
food through unregulated economies (e.g., trade and barter, street and farmers’ 
markets, gardening and gleaning). PBF has certainly not put an end to such practices, 
but formal economic activity has grown enormously in rural areas due to the 
program’s spending regulations. Such trends clearly lend support to critical analyses 
identifying the formalizing, neoliberal objectives of CCT programs (Meltzer, 2013; 
Saad-Filho, 2010, 2015; Standing, 2011). And not to be overlooked in all this are the 
owners of large grocery stores, some of whom profit tremendously from PBF 
expenditures. Thanks to CCTs millions of poor people now have enough to eat, but 
additional winners, especially in rural areas, appear to be business elites who have 
managed to capture both direct and spillover effects from these anti-poverty 
programs.    
 From a geographic standpoint, these changes indicate strong links between 
policy initiatives like PBF and formal economic development in small towns. The 
more PBF recipients a town and/or municipality can capture, the more capital is likely 
to be injected into both public and private (formal) enterprise. This lesson is by no 
means lost on municipal and business leaders – the divisions between which are often 
hard to tell – and can in some cases provoke poaching tactics along municipal and 
state borders. As evidence from Ponta Fina suggests, state actors sometimes take 
advantage of cartographic ambiguities to advance both municipal and state borders. 
The real crux of the Ponta Fina border dispute, as it happens, lies in a battle launched 
by state representatives in Piauí who claim that Ceará has tried to push its border 
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westward in recent years (Peixoto, 2012). For decades this territorial dispute has 
existed, with neither side paying much attention to the land or people in the middle. In 
recent years, however, the dispute has intensified politically, with neither state 
wanting to give ground. There are some in the region who speculate that control over 
natural resources and/or mining rights may have sparked these recent debates, but a 
broader analysis suggests that PBF may in fact lie at the root. Most everyone in Ponta 
Fina is quick to point out that infrastructural improvements have come almost 
exclusively in the last ten years, and that with PBF has also come increased political 
attention. Clearly a number of factors are at stake in this border dispute, but perhaps 
the key issue today is not so much territory or natural resources, or even labor or 
capital investment, but the residents themselves and the CCT money that follows 
them.    
 Connected to this are strategies used by municipalities to expand their territory 
and population bases. A common tactic, according to analysts with the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), is to establish new schools and health 
clinics in the far reaches of one’s municipality in hopes of luring residents who live 
across the municipal border. Whether people actually move their place of residence 
hardly matters: with their children in school and documentation from a local health 
clinic, families can often report they have migrated to officials in their ‘new’ 
municipality, and their records – and PBF registration – will be transferred. Rarely is 
there much groundtruthing to verify migratory change. Municipal officials, for their 
part, responded during interviews that such measures were necessary to provide better 
resources to under-facilitated areas. Residents on the outskirts of rural municipalities 
tend to be some of the poorest and, indeed, most infrastructurally underserved (see 
also Parsons, 2015). Yet when those same officials felt another municipality was 
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trying to win over their population, they often complained of territorial encroachment 
and appealed to the IBGE for cartographic verification using GPS coordinates. These 
disputes are especially common today in the Ponta Fina region due to geographic 
ambiguities, but they are by no means unique to the area. According to IBGE and 
municipal officials alike, these sorts of battles exist throughout Brazil and are indeed 
connected to federal and state resources (viz., money). PBF is of course not to blame 
for all of this geographic flux, but what findings from this case study in Ponta Fina 
certainly highlight are the links between CCT programs and geographic change. Not 
only are population numbers under increased scrutiny, but maps and territorial 
boundaries are being contested – and in some cases even refined – as State actors seek 
federal resources.  
 According to Staduto, Nascimento, and Souza (2014), migration patterns in 
northeastern Brazil have also changed significantly since PBF was inaugurated. 
Female outmigration from rural areas increased enormously since 2003, to the rate of 
almost twice that of men. Their research shows that young women especially are 
leaving rural areas for more urbanized ones. With few employment prospects for 
women and local cultural attitudes that offer little more than housework and 
childrearing, young women are moving in large numbers to towns and small cities. 
While the researchers do not identify any causal relationship between PBF and female 
outmigration, there is much evidence to suggest that the CCT program plays an 
important role. For example, per PBF conditionalities, record numbers of rural 
children are now completing secondary school. Combined with increasing levels of 
(formal) economic activity in many small towns and urban areas – fueled by Brazil’s 
growing export economy of primary commodities and expanding middle class (cf., 
Lapola et al., 2014) – rural areas now have a more educated labor force and rising 
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employment opportunities. It is hardly a stretch, therefore, to suggest that PBF 
expenditures connect in many ways to these new migration trends. As Staduto et al. 
(2014) conclude, there are a host of migration factors at work in the Brazilian 
countryside and agricultural settings elsewhere, and not least among issues to 
deliberate are the effects of CCT programs.  
 Finally still to be considered are expanding transportation networks in regions 
like Ponta Fina. As more children commute daily to school, and rural families visit 
towns and urban areas with greater frequency, transportation demands are on the rise 
in Brazil and other countries where CCTs are at work. Thanks in large part to 
government tax and credit incentives, the number of motorized vehicles on Brazilian 
roads has more than tripled since the start of the twenty-first century (Jones & 
Azevedo, 2013). Motorcycle ownership in particular has skyrocketed, and even in 
poor areas like Ponta Fina, many families now own a motorcycle or scooter. But with 
more transportation options, and also more reasons to commute, demand for better 
roadways has gained momentum in the Brazilian countryside. In the Ponta Fina 
region, small construction crews are now at work nearly every day on roadways and 
transportation infrastructure (see Fig. 4). Perhaps surprisingly, this push to create, 
improve, and pave more roads has not been led solely by isolated residents: many 
municipal leaders now recognize the importance of transportation networks in rural 
space. As one official noted during an interview, it is in “everyone’s” best interest to 
improve the geographic connectivities in the region. Discussing roadways in and 
around Ponta Fina, he explained:  
Children need to go to school everyday, so it’s important they’re not 
impeded by a precarious road. If they can’t go to school, you know 
what happens? It’s not just the child and their future that suffers. The 
family of that child will lose Bolsa Família, and so many more people 
will suffer. But it’s not just that; this is what I try to explain to people 
here in the city. The commerce of this city is very dependent on 
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everyone who lives in the region, you understand, when they come to 
town to buy and sell things. So the more access people in the 
countryside have, the easier it is for them to come to town. This is 
good for them, it’s good for commerce, it’s good for venders in the 
city. Everyone realizes the benefits.  
 
Implicit in such comments is the obvious fact that if families cannot fulfill PBF 
requirements because of poor access to schools, health clinics, or State institutions, 
then municipal centers also stand to lose much needed PBF expenditures. Much like 
other geographic changes, it would be unfair to suggest that PBF alone has induced 
the expansion of transportation networks in Ponta Fina, but like with other examples, 
this case certainly draws attention to the very broad effects of CCTs in rural areas. 
(Figure 4 about here.) 
 In many respects, these sorts of geographic changes point toward the 
intensification of neoliberal governance (i.e., governmentality – see for example 
Meltzer, 2013; Li, 2007; Miller and Rose, 2008). The State accomplishes more 
regulation and control over economic activity; there is the manipulation of space and 
cartographies; mobility and the movement of bodies are directed; and, ultimately, the 
population and their daily practice appear to be made more pliable and consistent. 
From one perspective, a geographic analysis supports findings that CCT programs 
promote the expansion of neoliberalism and governmentality, especially in rural areas 
(Ferguson, 2010; Hossain, 2010; Peck and Theodore, 2015; Saad-Filho, 2015; Sener, 
2015). But what CCTs attempt to accomplish and what they ultimately produce are 
not necessarily the same. In much the same fashion that CCTs can work to undermine 
pastoral relations of State governance, so too can populations fail to reproduce 
neoliberal ideologies and consumer characteristics in especially predictable ways. In 
the penultimate section of this article I explore this topic, drawing from examples of 
how Ponta Fina residents engage PBF on a daily basis. Ultimately it is not my 
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argument that CCTs are devoid of governmentality or neoliberal intentions, but rather 
to show how the outcomes and effects of these programs fail to match statecraft 
objectives.           
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE DIVERSE EFFECTS OF CCTS 
 A common grievance among the middle and upper classes in Brazil today is 
that PBF de-incentivizes work and makes recipients dependent upon government 
handouts (Soares, 2013). The argument, just like in many CCT countries, is that poor 
people prefer welfare to work, and families who do work hard risk losing their PBF 
eligibility. So rather than look for work, some believe, poor people would rather lay 
about, happily unemployed and collecting PBF benefits. Such opinions were 
expressed often in small towns near to Ponta Fina, where residents complained that 
“people of the countryside” no longer worked or even sought employment. Some 
went so far as to suggest that women were having more children in order to collect 
additional PBF money. Evidence for such statements, they claimed, could be found in 
municipal employment problems: in their experience it had become more difficult to 
find reliable service sector employees. In particular, many employers complained they 
could find no one to fill entry-level, minimum wage jobs. PBF was ruining Brazil’s 
economy, many grumbled, and at the root of the problem was the Worker’s Party 
(PT).    
 As it happens, there is very little published research to support such 
perceptions. Fertility rates have in fact dropped in regions where large percentages of 
the population receive PBF (Campello and Neri, 2013), and if the program has had 
much effect on labor markets, data suggest it may actually boost participation, at least 
for working age men (Soares, 2013). Hall (2013) provides nuance to these debates, 
suggesting that PBF likely incentivizes informal economic activity as recipients are 
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reluctant to disqualify themselves from program benefits. Nevertheless, the general 
consensus among researchers is that PBF and other CCTs are rarely detrimental to 
labor markets, and in some cases may in fact stimulate opportunity risks and 
entrepreneurialism (Pereira, 2015).  
The concerns expressed by employers near to Ponta Fina, however, deserve 
revisiting as they reflect some of the not-so-neoliberal effects of CCT programs. In 
the first instance, it may likely be true that PBF has made it more difficult for 
employers to fill low-paying jobs, and reasons for this are fairly obvious: 1) with 
increasing levels of education (albeit modestly so) among the poor, and growing 
employment markets in rural towns and cities, some poor people are finding better job 
opportunities, and; 2) quite simply, many of Brazil’s rural poor are no longer so 
desperate. They may still be part of a “relative surplus population” (Marx, 1976: p. 
782), especially those who live in rural areas, but they no longer confront hunger on a 
regular basis. While Brazil’s minimum wage has more than doubled in just the last 
decade, jobs that pay only one minimum wage salary continue to offer low pay for 
long hours. In the past, poor people had little choice, and often their options were to 
work minimum wage jobs or to go hungry. But PBF has given the poor more 
leverage, and in regions like Ponta Fina people today are less willing to work certain 
jobs they might have done in the past. This perspective was succinctly expressed 
during an interview with one man, a middle-aged lifetime resident of Ponta Fina: 
“Whether I work for him [i.e., some employer in town], or here in the countryside, 
I’m still poor. Whichever way, right? So I prefer to be poor here.”     
What these sorts of comments highlight – perhaps unanticipated in the designs 
of CCT initiatives – are the ways some people are able to use programs like PBF to 
keep their distance from neoliberal policies and practice. Cleary PBF is meant to 
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connect recipient families with formal economic markets, and even orient them 
towards practices of accumulation, investment, credit and risk, continued growth, and 
financial responsibility (recall Ferguson, 2010 – see also Campello and Neri, 2013, 
and Saad-Filho, 2015). And to be sure, increased formal economic activity, changing 
employment practices, and new migration trends all appear to suggest that such 
objectives are being achieved. Yet combined with these effects are others that seem in 
many ways counterproductive to the neoliberal goals of CCT programs. In Ponta Fina, 
for example, many residents noted that their waged labor had decreased in recent 
years, though this did not necessarily mean that they were working fewer hours. Many 
commented that they now had more time to “work for themselves,” conducting 
unpaid labor in areas such as farming and ranching, care giving, irrigation, 
construction, motor vehicle repair, teaching and instruction, etc. These activities, 
insisted interviewees, were more important to their communities and long-term needs 
of social reproduction than was extra money at the end of each month. Whereas in the 
past they had less control over the use of their labor due to extreme poverty, today 
they were more able to pick and choose where and when they engaged in paid and 
unpaid labor. Frustrating as it may be for employers in the region, minimum wage 
work appears to offer little appeal to rural residents who do not require the extra 
income.    
In essence, what these findings illustrate are the ways some (mostly rural) 
CCT recipients are able to keep one foot in formal economies and one foot out. On a 
few days each month, they visit nearby towns to collect their PBF benefits and/or 
make purchases, but most other days they have very little engagement with the formal 
economy. They participate in wage labor when and where they choose to, but they are 
no longer compelled by low-paying jobs for fear of going hungry. Clearly CCT 
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designers must anticipate some of these labor market effects, but what perhaps 
distinguishes rural populations are their tendencies to withdraw from formal markets 
and modes of production for so many days each month. They are capable of 
producing most of their own means of subsistence, and, just as crucially, they are not 
especially drawn to neoliberal discourses of profit maximization and private 
ownership, earnings and asset growth, wealth accumulation and investment, 
individualism and financial planning, and so on. Or rather, for them, these sorts of 
benefits are more likely to come from informal economic activities than from (low) 
wage labor ones. Just as CCTs, per their intention, pull them into formal economic 
markets and regimes of governmentality and neoliberalism, so too do they enable 
some beneficiaries to withdraw from these very same spaces and relationships. 
Despite strong evidence that formal economic activity is on the rise in rural Brazil due 
to PBF, this small study considering the labor practices of PBF recipients in Ponta 
Fina suggests that some people are in fact finding ways to reduce their participation 
with formalized modes of production.           
Just as importantly, this case study also reveals that rather than withering 
away, alternative economies (e.g., Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006) are prodigious in the 
Ponta Fina region. Though PBF benefits are spent in the first instance in formal 
markets, people by no means consume all of the goods they purchase. Interviews and 
participant observation revealed much trade and exchange of these goods after 
purchase, and thus program recipients find ways to exchange PBF benefits within 
informal markets. Not only is this a strategy for turning PBF benefits into more 
desirable commodities (i.e., goods not purchasable with PBF debit cards), but it can 
also facilitate non-capitalist exchange for labor, favors, livestock, water usage, ground 
rent, transport, and so on. Moreover, with more time to “work for themselves,” many 
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Ponta Fina residents engaged in informal production activities that benefitted their 
households and income strategies (e.g., carpentry, pottery, textiles, maintenance, 
gardening, baking, mechanical repair). Far from weaning rural populations from 
alternative economies and expanding their relationships with formal ones, data from 
this study show that non-capitalist markets and practices and un-neoliberal ideologies 
and objectives are alive and well in Ponta Fina thanks in part to PBF. Much like with 
rural labor markets – where PBF seems to have sparked just as many non-capitalist 
relationships as it has capitalist ones – alternative economies continue to thrive in 
parts of rural Brazil together with neoliberal policy objectives that underpin CCT 
programs.   
While the ongoing border dispute in Ponta Fina makes the region rather 
unique in many ways, the non-capitalist labor activities and alternative economies 
present in the area are likely widespread in much of rural Brazil. Alongside the 
neoliberal outcomes of PBF (e.g., economic formalization and increasing 
consumption – Saad-Filho, 2015) are other, seemingly unintended effects. 
Observations from this case study push and add insight to Ferguson’s (2010) 
suggestion that CCTs can produce myriad and seemingly contradictory effects. They 
also confirm and add flesh to Hall’s suspicions that PBF incentivizes informal 
economic activity (2013), though not necessarily because recipients fear disqualifying 
themselves from the scheme. In some cases, rural residents simply do not feel 
compelled to earn extra income or seek formal, wage-labor employment. Rather than 
being drawn to the technocratic discourses that underlie CCT programs  – e.g., 
neoliberal ones emphasizing individual autonomy/security and 
accumulation/investment, and governmentality ones stressing optimized production 
and State engagement – recipients take a step back. They harness the program in their 
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own, unanticipated ways. Thus the broader economic and governance objectives of an 
initiative like PBF are undermined, in some cases by the very effects of the program 
itself. CCT schemes may indeed be undergirded by neoliberalism and 
governmentality, but what they provoke, particularly in rural areas, are a host of 
practices that can run counter to the program’s own policy objectives.     
CONCLUSIONS 
 For most residents who live in the Ponta Fina region, State resources and 
governing protocol are complicated by the ongoing border dispute. To be sure, the 
State has a stronger presence in the region today than it did just ten years ago, but 
resident anxieties over this presence and how it affects their daily lives continue to 
persist. PBF has introduced a multitude of geographic changes, including new 
economic practices, migration patterns, trends in urban growth, infrastructural 
projects, political strategies, and so on. Local residents now have better access to 
schools, health clinics, formal markets, and transportation networks, and due to PBF 
their engagements with the State have expanded in many respects. Yet the border 
dispute between Ceará and Piauí obscures these processes, and the geographic 
ambiguity of Ponta Fina hinders the administration and reliability of CCT initiatives 
in numerous ways. Rather than working to resolve these issues, State actors have 
mostly dug in further, escalating a territorial dispute that for decades had gone almost 
unnoticed.  
Part and parcel with this have come demographic and cartographic flux, as 
states and municipalities seek new ways to capture populations and territorial units. 
While traditional border and land disputes often hinge upon access to natural 
resources, geographic connectivities, capital, and labor, evidence from this case study 
suggests that CCT benefits may in fact lie near the center. What appears most 
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important for State actors near to Ponta Fina is the administration of PBF, and state 
and federal resources that can accompany program benefits. Their fight seems less 
about rights to the landscape, and instead about rights to the population. They seek to 
wrangle in more PBF recipients and the money that follows them. While admittedly 
there are several attributes that distinguish the Ponta Fina region and this case more 
generally, findings from this study undoubtedly hold broader ramifications for other 
CCT programs. Indeed, the geographic effects of CCTs remain vastly understudied, 
and similar processes are almost certainly at work elsewhere, particularly in federative 
republics like Brazil.      
In addition to examining the geographies of programs like PBF, this article has 
also attempted to shed new light on debates over neoliberalism and governmentality 
and their connections to CCT initiatives. As Ferguson points out (2010), CCTs appear 
both neoliberal and pro-poor, yet more empirical research is needed to understand 
how they operate on the ground. Though this case study represents only a small step 
in this direction, the results indicate that neoliberal and governmentality objectives 
built into CCT programs co-exist alongside a host of seemingly paradoxical effects. In 
the case of governmentality, CCT program administration and the actions of State 
actors themselves can undermine critical networks of pastoral governance; and in the 
case of neoliberalism, ideologies of individualism, economic security, consumerism, 
and market formalization remain incomplete due to the ways CCT recipients make 
use of program benefits. Crucially, in both cases, it appears that broader governance 
aims built into CCT initiatives can in fact be stunted by the effects of the programs 
themselves. This is not to argue that CCTs are not intended to induce neoliberal and 
governmentality relationships, but instead to recognize how and why these programs 
sometimes fail to do so. Additionally, in the case of large and very diverse countries 
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like Brazil, it would appear that important CCT differences exist between urban and 
rural spaces.  
 Still to be considered are more robust studies of CCTs and their relationships 
to governance. Both ethnographic and quantitative data are needed to understand the 
roles of CCTs in processes of geographic change, and the ways they connect to 
capitalist (and non-capitalist) development paradigms and networks of State power. 
Related to this are questions of citizenship, identity, and gender, and the day-to-day 
changes induced by CCT programs in recipient households. As evidence from Ponta 
Fina suggests, PBF may be having a profound impact on female outmigration in rural 
areas, and the ramifications this holds for family structure, gender roles, and strategies 
of social reproduction are yet to be fully investigated. Moreover, findings from this 
study highlight important differences between urban and rural space, and the ways 
CCTs manifest differently in each one. More research is needed not only to better 
understand geographic processes of governance and development, but to also 
recognize changing attributes between urban and rural areas. Ultimately, as I have 
tried to show in this article, exploring the links between CCTs and political 
geographic change in developing countries is crucial for analyzing contemporary 
governance, development, space, and the State. This article provides a humble step in 
this direction, and contributes, I hope, to further debates of State power and 
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i There is no widely accepted or commonly used name for the disputed region. 
Perhaps most often it is referred to as the Ibiapaba or the Serra da Ibiapaba, though 
these names are also used to describe the region more generally and do not indicate 
the border dispute specifically. Throughout my research, when I spoke to people in 
the field, I referred to this area as “the disputed area” (“a área de litígio”) between 
Ceará and Piauí. I could find no other moniker that was broadly recognized.   ii	Throughout this article I refer to both ‘states’ (i.e., provincial units within federative 
republics like Brazil, Mexico, the U.S., etc.) and ‘States’ (e.g., opposite civil society, 
the broader governance apparatuses usually located at the national scale). To avoid 
ambiguity, I refer to the former as ‘states’ (i.e., not capitalized) and the latter as 
‘States’ (i.e., capitalized).	
iii	Unless otherwise noted, the data, quotes, and observations in this article come from 
interviews and fieldnotes recorded by the author while conducting research in the 
Ponta Fina region. 	
